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chapter 2
European Postal Networks
Nikolaus Schobesberger, Paul Arblaster, Mario Infelise, André Belo, 
Noah Moxham, Carmen Espejo and Joad Raymond
During the early sixteenth century state postal routes, based on a sequence of 
horses ridden by a single rider across a series of organised stages, were devel-
oped across Europe and were progressively transformed into public services. 
Postal communication was fundamental to European news, and though they 
were by no means the only basis of communication they formed the essential 
spine to news networks.1 We have two working assumptions: the first, that the 
penetration of avvisi into the public culture of early-modern Europe (i.e. 
beyond official communications) depended on the development of accessi-
ble postal services. The second is that (relatively) predictable public postal 
deliveries, which developed out of state administrative needs and manuscript 
culture, including manuscript news, were a precondition for the development 
of a (relatively) periodic newspaper press. Once newspapers were established, 
they could draw in communications from other types of network connection 
(merchants, churches and monasteries, booksellers, diplomatic couriers, sol-
diers, travellers, ships’ captains, and so on), but to be widely established in the 
first place they needed reliable public posts, bringing correspondence from a 
number of newswriting centres elsewhere. In this article we sketch the vari-
ous postal systems that transversed Europe, and, crucially, how they were 
interconnected.
 The Holy Roman Empire
Until the 1490s the communication network in the Holy Roman Empire was 
built up by courier services of merchant families, cities, aristocrats and sover-
eigns. All these services were inaccessible to the wider public. Due to the needs 
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of the Habsburg dynasty for communication over longer distances, primarily 
for the gathering of political news for the court and for administration, but 
additionally to serve the needs of the emerging merchant communities and 
cities, the postal system in the Holy Roman Empire developed very rapidly in 
the last decades of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth 
century.
The reasons for establishing an Imperial post were the emerging needs of 
the Habsburgs for an efficient method of communication after the acquisi-
tions of the Burgundian and later the Spanish Inheritance. In particular the 
emperor, Charles v, who reigned over the Spanish kingdoms with their colo-
nies, the Low Countries, southern Italy, Lombardy and the Holy Roman Empire, 
was very interested in developing a fast and efficient information system.
Maximilian i first established an Imperial postal system in 1490, immedi-
ately after he gained control over the county of Tyrol. The management of this 
Imperial post was given to the Taxis family, originating from Bergamo, whose 
members had rich experiences in the courier services of the pope and of 
Venice. They built up a system of posting houses between Innsbruck and 
Brussels, the residence of Maximilian’s son Philipp. On this main route the run-
ning time was a mere five days (six in winter).
The main route went from Brussels via Augsburg to Innsbruck then across 
the Alps to northern Italy, where the Imperial post connected with the postal 
systems of the Italian states. The first headquarters of the Imperial post was 
Innsbruck, the favoured residence of Emperor Maximilian I. In 1501 the postal 
centre moved to Brussels and was subordinated to the Spanish crown. In 1505 
Franz von Taxis and Philip i of Spain signed a contract, in which the post was 
awarded the status of an independent service company. In the second 
Neerlando-Spanish postal contract of 1516, the Taxis gained control over the 
postal system in the Italian territories of the Spanish crown. In 1530 Emperor 
Charles v appointed Johann Baptist von Taxis to the rank of postmaster-
general over all his territories, including the Holy Roman Empire. This led the 
way from the Spanish Taxis-post to the future Imperial post. For financial rea-
sons, the Taxis began, in the first decade of the sixteenth century at the latest, 
not only to transport the dynastic and administrative post of the Habsburgs, 
but also to offer their service to other groups of customers. This meant that not 
only the major merchant families, like the Fuggers and the Welsers from 
Augsburg, but also cities, secular and clerical authorities, and private persons 
could make use of the postal service. They had to pay a postal charge for the 
transport of the mail.
In this way the dynastic transport service changed its character into a ser-
vice company, accessible to everyone, with a defined scale of charges and 
 regular traffic. By the 1530s at the latest the postal service had weekly intervals. 
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The pre-existing courier services of cities, merchants and aristocrats in the 
Holy Roman Empire connected to the postal route from Brussels to Innsbruck. 
News could circulate more quickly than before and the space between the 
North Sea and the Mediterranean was shrinking.
In the second half of the sixteenth century other Princes of the Holy Roman 
Empire installed their own messenger relay services, which were only for their 
private needs, not for the public. Correspondingly, during the sixteenth cen-
tury the major merchant cities built a network of courier services along the 
main trading routes in the Empire. The cities of Augsburg, Nuremberg, 
Frankfurt, Cologne, Leipzig and Hamburg, which were (except for Augsburg 
and later Cologne) not connected to the Imperial post, were connected by 
their own services. For example the Nuremberg courier connected the cities of 
Nuremberg and Hamburg and was the main communication line to the 
Hanseatic states of northern Germany. A letter from Cologne to Hamburg 
would have been transported by the Cologne courier to Frankfurt, by the 
Frankfurt courier to Nuremberg and by the Nuremberg courier to Hamburg.
The post intensified and accelerated communication in every way, for 
instance through the sending of letters and news, the transportation of pas-
sengers, and the cashless transactions via bills of exchange. On the main route 
between Brussels and Innsbruck the distances between posting houses were 
reduced from 35 to 22 km and in the first third of the seventeenth century to 15 
km. Until the implementation of the mail coach in the late seventeenth cen-
tury, private persons could use the service of the posting houses for hiring and 
changing horses. The first evidence for the use of this service dates from 1515.
As the payments from the Spanish Habsburgs were notoriously slow and 
incomplete, the Taxis post focused on private transportation. Brussels 
remained the main centre of the Taxis post and the seat of the general post-
master. In the Holy Roman Empire the ‘Spanish’ post was increasingly seen as 
an aberration. This intensified in the second half of the sixteenth century due 
to the national bankruptcies of Spain and the Dutch War of Independence, 
starting in 1568. In 1577 the international postal system of the Taxis collapsed, 
after the postmaster-general Leonhard I von Taxis lost his property during the 
Dutch rebellion and left the Netherlands. During this postal crisis the local 
courier services of cities and merchants filled the void in communication and 
information. The reformation of the post by Emperor Rudolf ii put an end to 
the postal crisis. In 1595 Leonhard von Taxis was declared the General high 
postmaster of the Holy Roman Empire. In 1597 Rudolf ii declared the postal 
transportation in the Empire to be an Imperial prerogative, which was granted 
to the Taxis family as a fiefdom. It was forbidden, under threat of severe penal-
ties, for other courier services to offer the transportation of post and to use 
the post horn. The aim of this regulation was to build a monopoly of postal 
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transportation under the control of the imperial administration. The newly 
christened ‘Reichspost’ was to be made profitable by eliminating its private 
competitors. Despite the forbidding of private postal services, the courier sys-
tems of the cities and merchants were necessary to ensure service to the whole 
Empire till the nineteenth century.
The monopoly of the centralised Taxis post in postal transportation made 
governmental censorship possible, which was first used on a large scale during 
the 1640s.
Beginning in around the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the main 
postal route from Antwerp to Innsbruck and Italy was complemented by new 
routes. In this way a postal network was formed. New postal stations were 
established in the major cities Cologne (1577), Frankfurt (1598), Hamburg 
(1616), Erfurt (1616), Nuremberg (1617) and Regensburg (1618). The founding of 
these postal houses was necessary after the prohibition of private postal ser-
vices. Between 1604 and 1615 a route from Cologne via Frankfurt and Nuremberg 
to Prague was built. Just before the beginning of the Thirty Years War, the post 
house in Frankfurt replaced Augsburg as the most important centre in the 
German postal network. German princes besides the Emperor also built up 
their own postal systems in their territories. Especially during the Thirty Years 
War a lot of German territories—especially in the northern parts of the 
Empire, that fell under the Swedish sphere of influence—established postal 
networks after the model of the Taxis Reichspost.
In fact the first territorial postal system was the court post of the Habsburgs 
in the Austrian, Bohemian and Hungarian territories, which was already in 
place at the beginning of the sixteenth century and also managed by the Taxis 
family. In 1623 the management was transferred to the Styrian Paar family. Like 
the Reichspost, the Austrian Post was initially licensed to transport only the 
mails of the Habsburgs, the court and the administration. The ‘court Post’ was 
connected to the Reichspost by two routes, one from Vienna to Innsbruck, the 
other from Prague to Augsburg, which were established in the 1520s.
During the Thirty Years War the rulers of Brandenburg, Brunswick-Lüneburg, 
Saxony and Hesse-Kassel licensed their own postal systems, which were loosely 
connected to the Reichspost. In 1648 Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg 
ordered the building of a Brandenburgian postal system. The first route con-
nected Memel-Berlin-Kleve with branches to Amsterdam, Hamburg, Stettin, 
Leipzig, Breslau and Warsaw. The Brandenburg post was organised as a govern-
mental enterprise under the control of the Brandenburg state council.
In 1658 the fiefdom of the post to the Taxis family (Thurn and Taxis since 
1650) was renewed after the election of Emperor Leopold I. First the postal 
rights of the German territorial princes were respected, until 1660, when 
Leopold, who was very much interested in an imperially controlled postal 
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monopoly, prohibited all territorial posts. Brandenburg, Brunswick and Hesse, 
which all had their own territorial postal services, joined with Sweden in their 
rejection of the authority of the Reichspost. The following decades were domi-
nated by competitions between the Reichspost and the territorial services, 
which were also in competition with each other. Several postal routes were 
operated by two or more postal services. For example on the route Aachen-
Cologne-Frankfurt-Leipzig the Brandenburg Post and the Taxis Reichspost 
were in direct competition.
In 1681 the Elector of Saxony took control of all postal services in his lands 
and ordered the building of a territorial system as well. The differences between 
the Brandenburg and the Saxony posts lasted until 1699. As it was politically 
impossible for Leopold I to enforce the claim of the Reichspost-monopoly for 
the whole empire a mixed system was established, whereby the northern ter-
ritories enjoyed their own system and the southern parts of Germany came 
under control of the Reichspost. This plurality of services persisted until 1700.2
 The Netherlands and Further Afield
Both the Northern Netherlands (the Dutch Republic) and the Southern 
(Habsburg) Netherlands had dense networks of civic carriers and (especially 
in the North) barge and ferry services for the internal communications between 
various larger and smaller towns.3 One source that opens a window on to the 
density of carrier networks in the Southern Netherlands is the overview drawn 
up around 1618 by Father Damiaan Pletz, secretary to the provincial of the 
Flemish Province of the Capuchin order, showing the various fortnightly, 
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weekly, twice- or thrice-weekly, and sometimes daily services available between 
the towns in which there was a Capuchin house.4 These services ranged from 
licensed carriers to poulterers and yeastmen who carried messages on their 
regular rounds. This was a working document for a man who needed to com-
municate with the houses of his order, so it omits all towns not on the Capuchin 
network except for the ports Nieuwpoort and Dunkirk (important for their 
shipping connections).
Another partial source, listing only those carriers with services from Ghent, 
can be found in an almanac printed in Ghent for the year 1636.5 Frequencies 
again varied from fortnightly (to Hondschoote), through weekly (to Paris, to 
London), to two or three times per week (to most towns in Flanders), and even 
daily (to Bruges, to Brussels and to Antwerp).
By 1541 Antwerp was connected to the main imperial post when a Taxis 
branch office opened in the city; Brussels was already the headquarters from 
which the Taxis dynasty ran the imperial posts. The main international post 
road, the backbone of Europe’s postal communications, was from Brussels to 
Augsburg to Trent, there splitting for Venice, for Rome, and for Milan.6 There 
was daily service between Brussels and Antwerp, which was the point at which 
the Taxis post connected with the Antwerp civic carrier system that linked to 
London and to the northern Netherlands.7
The fullest contemporary description of the ordinary posts of Europe is pro-
vided by Ottavio Codogno, deputy postmaster general of the state of Milan, in 
his Nuovo itinerario delle poste per tutto il mondo, first printed in 1608 and much 
reprinted, sometimes under the title Compendio delle poste (see Figure  2.2). 
Codogno explains that those wishing to write beyond the northern confines of 
the ordinary public posts could do so by having their letters forwarded through 
Antwerp’s merchant carrier networks:
Should you wish to write to the States of Holland, that is The Hague, 
Dordrecht, Haarlem, Rotterdam, Delft, Leiden, Amsterdam, Utrecht, Gelre, 
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Zutphen, Arnhem and Nijmegen, or further to Lübeck, Rostock, Wismar, 
Stralsund and Novgorod, do so by way of the merchants of Antwerp.8
This ‘merchant post’ was licensed by the city and based at the Antwerp 
Exchange. The combination in Antwerp of a Taxis post office and the extensive 
system of merchant carriers made the city one of the most important postal 
interchanges north of the Alps.
Older corporate bodies (such as monasteries and universities) had dedi-
cated messengers with some sort of postal privilege, but these were not open 
to the general public; some letters continued to be sent by private couriers, by 
ships’ captains, or through trade connections that were not strictly postal, and 
even by chance travellers; while government bodies made frequent use of spe-
cial couriers. The systems that were both regular and public were the civic (or 
merchant) carriers, licensed by the cities from which they operated, and the 
royal posts run by the Taxis family.
In the first half of the seventeenth century Amsterdam’s main interna-
tional carrier services were provided from Antwerp, Cologne and Hamburg. 
In the second half of the century Amsterdam developed its own civic con-
trol of the Dutch end of these connections, which were eventually merged 
and nationalised in the eighteenth century.9 There were also services 
between Antwerp and Rotterdam. Attempts to establish Dutch postal con-
nections to England in the second half of the seventeenth century were 
complicated by the Anglo-Dutch Wars. A service from Rotterdam to Dover, 
begun in 1660, failed to survive past 1665,10 while an Amsterdam service, 
with a packet boat between Harwich and Hellevoetsluis,11 survived (with 
interruptions) but became a point of contention, litigation and lobbying 
between Amsterdam and Rotterdam well into the eighteenth century.12 The 
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Dutch posts to Hamburg were a similar bone of contention between the 
two cities.13
During the second phase of the Eighty Years War (1621–48) there were 
packet boats from Middelburg and Vlissingen to Rouen and Calais, to avoid 
passage through the Southern Netherlands, but these could fall victim to 
Dunkirk privateering. Military activities and marauding soldiers could disrupt 
other parts of the network in various ways.14 The rivalry in Holland between 
the merchants of Rotterdam and of Amsterdam was mirrored in the South by 
the rivalry between the Taxis postmaster general in Brussels and the Taxis post-
master of Antwerp early in the century, as well as between the Taxis system 
and the civic carrier system through mid-century.15 Central government insis-
tence that civic carriers defer to the Taxis posts was a blow to Antwerp’s posi-
tion as the linchpin of the carrier and postal systems, leading to protests and 
civil disobedience that verged on rebellion, and that were put down by military 
force.16 In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Taxis postmaster 
general in Brussels co-operated with the postmaster of Rotterdam to cut 
Antwerp out of the main link between Holland and Paris, ending the city’s 
importance to Europe’s postal infrastructure.17
 Italy
Under Giangaleazzo Sforza, Duke of Milan from 1378 to 1402, there was a radi-
cal reorganisation of the postal system in a modern sense. The main routes 
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were divided into stages called poste that were covered by professional post 
riders with in-depth knowledge of the roads who could even travel by night. 
During this period the postal system became a public service with fixed 
departure times and charges that were known to all and accessible to anyone 
who could afford it, regardless of rank or class.18 During the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries, this system gradually extended to all of northern Italy and 
central and western Europe, becoming—as pointed out by Wolfgang 
Behringer—‘a crucial agent of change’ that distinguished Europe from con-
temporary Asia where such communication networks were the exclusive pur-
view of rulers.19
Thus the final decades of the fourteenth century saw the introduction of 
wide-range postal services with regular public dispatches and courses. In 1395 
the Milanese agent of the Datini company wrote that every Sunday a courier 
would leave for Venice and Bruges, and that another rider would stop off on his 
way from Lucca to Paris.20 These postal services were run by private entrepre-
neurs or princes with the aim of providing an efficient and reliable service 
along constantly expanding routes; post sent from Milan took 26 days to reach 
London, 16 days to Paris, 18 to Barcelona, 11 to Rome and 4 to Venice.21 The ser-
vice continued to improve steadily throughout the fifteenth century, and by 
the time the Taxis family from Bergamo obtained the contract for the Imperial 
postal services in the early 1500s, tried and tested models would have been 
available to them. In the meantime other leading Italian entrepreneurs had 
also invested in this sector, harnessing consolidated organisational capacities 
and networks of relationships, as in the case of Sebastiano Montelupi who was 
appointed in 1568 by the King of Poland to set up a postal service between 
Venice and Krakow.22 At the time all the major European cities had official post 
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offices to handle and forward correspondence. There was also a network of 
postal stations at fixed intervals on the main routes where couriers could 
change their horses, leading to more regular delivery times, and clearly defined 
routes and exchange nodes.
In Italy, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the system focused on a 
central axis heading northwards from Rome towards Flanders. Urban centres 
of varying importance were all connected to this axis—bearing in mind that 
the Italian peninsula featured both states of European importance along with 
a series of more or less independent minor courts like the duchies of Mantua 
and Parma, the Republic of Lucca and many more fiefs aiming for capital sta-
tus that needed to maintain links with the larger European network. There 
were a number of crucial nodes, like Rome, Venice and Milan, along with sec-
ondary nodes that were nonetheless important for the regular flow of informa-
tion, like Naples, Genoa, Turin and Florence.
One of the key nodes in the seventeenth century was Rome, which had per-
manent links to Naples, the transit node for couriers from southern Italy, Sicily 
and Lecce/Otranto. Couriers from Lecce/Otranto transported letters from 
Corfu, from the entire Greek area and from Constantinople.23 Correspondence 
from the capital of the Ottoman Empire also reached Rome via the Ragusa 
(Dubrovnik) to Ancona route.24 The ordinari couriers tra velling northwards 
from Rome headed for Genoa, Florence, Bologna and Ancona-Venice.
Venice not only had fairly frequent links to the minor centres in northern 
Italy, it also sent correspondence by ordinari couriers to Milan then via Genoa 
to Spain or via Turin to Lyon and France. Another important route headed 
north along the Trent road via the Brenner Pass and Augsburg for Germany and 
Flanders. The Vienna route via Gorizia and Graz was also very important. There 
was also a sea route going from Venice to Cattaro (Kotor), a Venetian port on 
the southern Dalmatian coast, and via Ragusa (Dubrovnik) to the Balkans and 
Constantinople, which was in turn a key node for correspondence from the 
entire Middle Eastern and Asian area.
Italy’s third nodal point was Milan, which had connections to all major 
Italian centres, and couriers leaving for Flanders via Cologne, and for Prague 
via Trent, Munich and Regensburg. The system overall was consolidated and 
highly efficient, and from 1608 there were handbooks explaining in great detail 
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how it worked. It was in 1608 that Ottavio Codogno, the Milanese deputy post-
master general, published his highly popular guide to the postal services that 
went through several reprints during that century. Though focused on Europe, 
it extended to the entire known world, describing a network that allowed 
 people to send and receive correspondence between the far-flung corners 
of the world. Readers of the guide would discover that if they needed to send 
a letter from Milan to Goa in India, they would have to ensure that their 
correspondence reached Lisbon by 20 March, which is when the Portuguese gal-
leons weighed anchor for the Indies.
The nodal points of the postal system automatically became places 
where news was received and sent on. The organisation of ordinari couriers 
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Figure 2.1 The nodes in the flows of information across Italy
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and diffusion of information were obviously closely connected. In the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, the names of postmasters 
often crop up among the subscribers to news-sheets by the leading gazetteers, 
suggesting they had taken charge of diffusing and probably even reproducing 
these newsletters. From the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, the 
gradual improvement of postal links and greater frequency contributed to the 
regular publication of handwritten gazettes, which depended upon the arrival 
of the couriers, making frequent reference to this fact. At the time the stan-
dard travel time was 4–5 days from Rome to Venice, 8 days from Rome to 
Milan, 12–15 to Vienna and 20–25 to Paris. These were average travel times. 
Particularly important news, like the death of a pope or of a ruler, was sent via 
extraordinary couriers who could travel extremely fast. Usually, the news from 
Paris was published in Venice between 20 and 25 days after the event. But if 
the piece of news had major political importance, the time differed. In such 
cases the posts were entrusted to extraordinary couriers, who would stop for 
nothing. For example, the news of the assassination of Henri iv of France in 
1610 reached Venice after only 8 days after the fact and was published in the 
main handwritten gazette after 15, when the news was already the subject of 
public debate.25 
Figure 2.2 Ottavio Codogno’s scheme of postal routes
25
25 M. Infelise, ‘Les mécanismes de l’information: l’arrivée à Venise de la nouvelle de 
l’assassinat d’Henri IV’ in J. Foa, P.-A. Mellet, Le bruit des armes. Mises en formes et 
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désinformations en Europe pendant les guerres de Religion (1560–1610) (Paris: Honoré 
Champion, 2012), pp. 365–381.
26 Stephane Haffemayer, ‘Les gazettes de l’Ancien Régime. Approche quantitative pour 
l’analyse d’un “espace de l’information”’, Histoire et mesure, 12 (1997), pp. 69–91, at 85.
The relevance of nodes also affected the speed of communications. 
Travel times depended less on the effective distances of routes than on the 
ability of couriers and gazetteers to coordinate their activities so that writ-
ers could exploit downtime and compile their news-sheets in the intervals 
between the arrival of one courier and the departure of the next. In fact, 
news did not necessarily travel along the shortest route nor did shorter 
routes necessarily guarantee shorter times. For example, it was difficult for 
the news of Florence to reach Bologna directly; it was more likely that 
news would be collected in Rome or Venice and then sent to Bologna. 
Similarly, avvisi from Genoa did not reach Ancona directly, crossing the 
peninsula from west to east, but would travel via Rome or Venice first. This 
led to the creation of preferential routes along which information would 
travel faster due to the better organisation of postal services or existence of 
political relations favouring the establishment of more efficient lines of 
communication. In France, news from Marseille took only 11 days to reach 
the Paris Gazette: a distance of 809 kilometres  covered at a rate of 74 kilo-
metres per day. News from Milan, which was in Spanish hands, took 24 
days to cover a distance of 850 kilometres, an average speed of 36 kilome-
tres per day.26
The efficiency of transport systems also depended on the political relations 
between Italian states and other European powers. After 1713, when the 
Kingdom of Naples passed to the Austrian Habsburgs, it took only 16 days from 
news from Vienna to be published in the Neapolitan gazette, rather than 22 
days as had been the case when Naples was under Spanish rule. It was now 
possible to cover the 1350 kilometres between the two cities travelling 84 kilo-
metres per day instead of 61 as in the past. At the same time, links between 
Naples and Spain became weaker.
The postal services had a significant impact upon the total costs of pro-
ducing news-sheets, even though precise data is not always available. In 
1664, Mantua’s printed gazette, which was published under the protection of 
the duke, was compiled using handwritten avvisi arriving every week from 
Venice, Vienna, Cologne, Brussels, Amsterdam and Augsburg in particular. 
Subscriptions, including postal fees, ranged from 240 lire for newsletters from 
Augsburg to 360 lire for those from Brussels and Cologne, accounting for 46.3% 
of the total costs; the remainder was made up of costs for printing (47.4%) and 
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paper (6.3%).28 The breakdown of costs for Milan’s printed gazette (Table 2.1) 
is more detailed, and shows that postal expenses could account for 8.4% of the 
total investment.
 France
One of the earliest postal services in France was the system of university 
 mes sengers established in the fourteenth century. The University of Paris’s sys-
tem was particularly extensive, with the student body divided into four 
‘nations’ (three for the various regions of France and one for students from 
England, Northern Germany and the Low Countries) and messengers assigned 
to each.29 The positions were made more attractive by exempting them from 
certain taxes.30 Similar exemptions were afforded to the postal couriers estab-
lished in the late fifteenth century under Louis xi.
Table 2.1 Estimate of the costs of the Milan Gazette, 165927
£ %
Rent of premise 900 18.9
Compilation 1500 31.5
office worker 720 15.1
postal expenses 400 8.4
delivery in Milan 72 1.5
Supplies 200 4.2
Printing 800 16.8
lighting / heating 72 1.5
Avvisi 100 2.1
Total 4764 100.0
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The postal couriers were set up as a royal service by an Act of 1464, which, it 
has been suggested, had two original purposes: to keep the king informed of 
the dauphin’s illness, and to allow for better communication to areas where 
French troops were campaigning.31 As in England and Wales, the initial relays 
were not permanent but ad hoc, put in place for a month at a time with options 
for extension. The system was designed for the exclusive use of the crown and 
was, in theory, strictly policed until the late sixteenth century. It was in no 
sense a public service or a reliable letter-post.32 Nevertheless the improve-
ments made by Louis xi to the royal posts provided the infrastructure of the 
French public posts from when they emerged in the seventeenth century until 
the advent of the railways.
The early routes to Burgundy, Picardy and Guyenne were established as 
matters of administrative or military necessity. Later routes to Lyon were 
important not just because of Lyon’s significance but because of its position as 
a communications hub to the Languedoc, Switzerland, and Italy; the Boulogne 
road enabled better communication with England, and the Picardy road with 
Flanders.
In practice, the development of the public postal service in sixteenth- 
century France was essentially an extension, often by abuse, of the notional 
royal monopoly of letter-transport, until the public use of the posts became 
officially tolerated during the reign of Henri iv. There is evidence, from an edict 
issued to prevent the practice in the Languedoc in 1550, of royal messengers 
supplementing their meagre wages by carrying private letters; a report by a 
Spanish envoy from 1572 details the same thing among the messengers attached 
to princes of the blood. (The French crown had also been notably resistant 
to the extension of the Taxis posts across their territory, although it repre-
sented  the natural land route between the Habsburg territories in the Low 
Countries and Spain—see the sections on the Imperial posts above and the 
Spanish posts below. In the 1560s and 1570s special messengers for the Habsburg 
monarchies passing through France were occasionally attacked by Huguenot 
bandits with a particular interest in the contents of their messages.33)
One of the key components of the system was its regulatory aspect. The car-
rying of private letters by the royal messengers was technically forbidden and 
warrants were periodically issued to that effect; the very fact that reminders 
had to be issued suggests that they were largely ineffective, however. This was 
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also manifested in the monopoly on horse-hire granted to local postmasters 
and periodically renewed, along with exemption from various duties as part of 
their compensation (their wages by themselves were relatively insignificant; 
and when the Crown ceased to be able to pay them at all, following France’s 
long wars with the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, Catherine de Medici’, the 
Queen Regent, renewed the horse-hire monopoly in lieu of them).34 This privi-
lege was linked to the Crown’s interest in monitoring the passage of strangers 
over French territory, and theoretically made it impossible for a foreigner to 
pass through the Kingdom unknown, as well as restricting the routes he or she 
could travel on.35 Francis I, who imposed this stricture, was also anxious that 
there should be no private use of the service, and he forbade the establishment 
of any rival network. The privilege was essentially unenforceable anywhere 
except on the great highways, however; the byways, where many of the people 
who actually hired horses lived, including farmers and smallholders, lay 
beyond the reach of the authorities in practice. The privilege was also designed 
to restrict, or at any rate make predictable, the speed at which a person could 
travel on French roads; a horse hired at the daily rate had to be returned to the 
renter, and it was the hirer’s responsibility to see it done.36 The system was 
liberalised by Henri iv in 1597/8, finally permitting horse-hire for ploughing 
and barge-pulling as well as travel, and legalising it on the byways as well as the 
highways.
During the period of illicit use of the royal post by private individuals, and 
even by the time of Henri iv’s assassination in 1610, the network did not cover 
the whole of France. This was partly a matter of attempts by the Crown to 
 displace the expenses of the service onto the regions, which had been a long 
struggle. From the 1590s Brittany and the Languedoc, in particular, were 
 resistant; when Brittany was charged for expenditure on the service, the Estates 
of Brittany responded that no posts had been established in their  territory and 
that it would be dangerous to allow them to be. Brittany was notable for con-
tinuing its opposition into the 1620s, by which time most of the other regional 
authorities had come around. And indeed the map drawn up of French post 
routes in 1632 by Nicolas Sanson (see Figure 2.3) shows that Brittany, histori-
cally an independent duchy which became subject to the French crown only in 
1532, was almost completely disconnected from the primary network.
By 1615—the point at which Fouquet de la Varane sold his office of 
Comptroller-General to Pierre d’Almeras—the postal service was organised 
roughly as follows: Maîtres des Postes supplied the actual means of transport, 
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manning the relay stations and supplying horses; couriers to carry the letters; 
and commis  and distributors to deal with the public, which meant collecting 
the postage or duties on letters, making sure letters actually reached their pri-
vate recipients, and so on. This system was fairly attractive for the man in 
charge, and Vaillé points out that it was in his interest to make sure that the 
system did not change too much, because the crown and the localities paid for 
the system’s infrastructure and expenses while the Comptroller-General took 
the profit. If the setup became too costly he risked shaking things up to his own 
disadvantage.
The creation of the public posts from 1630 changed the management of the 
postal service, liberating the controleur­général from the oversight of the 
Grand Ecuyer (master of the royal stables). He was replaced in 1630 by the first 
Surintendant­général. The regional and local postmasters effectively bought or 
leased their offices from the Surintendant, as they had formerly done from the 
Comptroller-General, with the size of the payment depending on the value of 
the particular post. The inauguration of the post as a public service also saw 
the introduction of postal tariffs for the first time. These were relatively simple, 
envisaging only four destinations (Lyon, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Dijon/Macon) 
Figure 2.3 Nicolas Sanson, Carte géographicque des postes qui trauersent la France. A Paris …
Par Melchior Tauernier …, 1632. (HMC01.6723), Historic Maps Collection, Department 
of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library
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and three basic rates (for single letters, small packets of up to half an ounce in 
weight, and large packets of over an ounce). In France as in Britain, postage 
was payable by the recipient, not the sender.
In addition to the University messengers and the special royal couriers, com-
munal messenger services had begun to be established from the late sixteenth 
century. These were initially very little disturbed by the establishment of the 
public posts, which only gradually began to challenge and absorb them as they 
came to be seen as direct competitors for revenue. Toulouse, for example, 
employed 14 messengers, 3 providing a dedicated service to Paris and two each 
to Toulon and Bordeaux, with an implied break between journeys for each 
messenger. Departures for Paris were fortnightly; the journey would take two 
weeks, and the messenger would remain in Paris for eight days to distribute 
and receive letters. On this reckoning the service was notably less efficient than 
its English equivalent, the carrier system, although it must be admitted that the 
English carriers had, for the most part, considerably less distance to cover.
In 1672 control was transferred to the Ferme Générale—the revenue-gathering 
service. Where the previous system had effectively left the revenue of the 
postal service in the hands of the people who actually ran it, the Ferme guaran-
teed a certain annual payment to the Crown’s treasury. The level of this was 
renegotiated every time a new Intendant was appointed, and the monarch 
could (and on several occasions did) displace the incumbent if he saw an 
opportunity for better terms.
 International Post
Philip the Fair of Burgundy attempted to extend the Habsburg Taxis posts to 
his French territories for the first time in 1504; Charles V issued a similar order 
in 1516 three years before becoming Holy Roman Emperor, although he speci-
fied that the route was to be established only with the permission of the French 
crown.37 Francis I also created permanent routes to Switzerland and north-
west Italy, as well as regular courier services to Rome and Venice in the mid-
sixteenth century. For the most part, however, organised international 
correspondence went via the Court’s special messengers and was chiefly con-
cerned with the specifics of foreign policy and affairs of state. Their privileged 
status, their proximity to the Court, and the fact that they could be brought to 
deliver other letters besides those the court had given them in charge gave 
them visibility; and Vaillé notes that diplomats would interrogate them for 
the latest news. The Venetian ambassador in France wrote to Venice in 1512 
to  complain of a messenger who went about announcing the news he was 
37
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carrying while en route; a grave breach of discretion, but one which demon-
strates their potential importance in the dissemination of news and not just 
the delivery of diplomatic messages.
The creation of a public letter-post wrought fundamental changes in the 
system; partly as the Comptroller-General endeavoured to bring international 
letter-traffic and the potential for financial gain that went with it under his 
own control. In particular they challenged the private courier systems organ-
ised by foreign merchant communities in France (and centralised, for Swiss 
and Italian traders, in Lyon). These organisations, by effectively extending 
edicts already in place for restricting the movement of silver, gold, specie, and 
uncustomed goods in France, were debarred from operating their own service; 
in exchange the Comptroller-General was obliged to guarantee a regular ser-
vice in its place, sending fortnightly couriers to Rome and Venice on the first 
and fifteenth of each month, with two more leaving Rome for Genoa and Lyon 
on the same days.38 With other states the system gradually became more inte-
grated, with each jurisdiction taking up the transportation of letters within its 
own territory; earlier in the sixteenth century the monarch faced a choice 
between employing his own messengers for the entirety of the journey to 
London (for instance) or entrusting his letters to the English king’s posts, a 
potentially risky approach.39
Just as the distinctive outlines of the English postal network are determined 
to some extent by its island position, France’s are determined by the way in 
which its territory is interposed in the middle of the Habsburg empire. The 
existence of the Taxis postal service effectively meant that there was little need 
for France to establish its own postal services for communication with Spain, 
Flanders, or the German lands. These routes were complex, and subject to 
local shifts occasioned by rebellions, changing alliances, outright disruption 
during the Thirty Years War, and were eventually displaced as the primary 
means of transmission across French territory by the establishment of the 
public letter-post and by Fouquet de la Varane’s attempts to bring this prop-
erly under his control.40
 Spain
The working of the mail system in early modern Spain is well understood, but 
studies have seldom considered the implications of this postal system in the 
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development of a national news market.41 How—in its more material 
 dimension—did news travel to and from Spain?
To begin with, news—in the form of cartas de aviso (handwritten news-
letters), as well as printed gazetas—circulated through the system of estafe­
tas or posts established by the king for the use of his subjects. Alongside 
this, there existed a royal mail system exclusively used by the authorities, 
and a further postal infrastructure employing private carriers and used by 
all sorts of people. This is why we often read in news pamphlets and gazettes 
that news had arrived through ‘el ordinario’—the ordinary mail system—or 
Figure 2.4 Madrid to Antwerp
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‘el extraordinario’—an extraordinary mail system. This is the same standard 
division as obtained in many other European jurisdictions.
The official Spanish mail system was established from 1580 onwards by the 
Taxis family; but, here as elsewhere in Europe, some other international mail 
systems—mainly the one established in Antwerp—were able to compete with 
it for efficiency and speed. In any case, these systems provided two main routes 
linking Spain with the rest of Europe: first, the route that joined the capital of 
the kingdom—Valladolid or Madrid—with Antwerp via Bordeaux and Paris; 
secondly, the route that linked the capital with Rome via Lyon (see Figure 2.5). 
Nevertheless, to reach this latter point, an alternative route started from 
Barcelona and reached Rome by the sea, via Genoa (see Figure 2.6).
Meanwhile, within in the Iberian Peninsula, the main route started in 
Irún,  close to the French border, and reached Vitoria, Burgos, Valladolid, 
Figure 2.5 Main postal routes linking Spain with the rest of Europe
Renacimiento Europeo. Estudio Postal del Archivo Simón Ruiz (1553–1630) (Madrid: 
Fundación Museo de las Ferias, 2004).
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Medina del Campo and Madrid, and, from there, the rest of the regional capi-
tals such as Barcelona, Lisbon and Seville. Prior to the eighteenth century, 
communication between Madrid and other towns in the Kingdom, Seville for 
instance, used to be done through mail on a weekly basis, weather permitting 
(see Figure 2.7).
European and Spanish mail to and from the Indies (or the Americas) was 
collected in Seville, the only port licensed to do so. The ‘Correo Mayor de 
Indias’—the official postmaster in the Americas—who resided in Lima, Perú, 
had leased this part of his business to successive lieutenants of the Casa de 
Contratación established in Seville: this was because from such a distance he 
was unable to manage the onward distribution of American mails within 
Spanish territories in Europe.
Despite the speed with which postal system was established in Habsburg 
kingdoms, Spain generally fell outside the mainstream conduits of the 
Figure 2.6 The alternative sea route from Madrid to Rome, via Barcelona and Genoa
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European news network. Paul Arblaster has remarked that the ‘reintegration’ 
of Spain within large international postal networks only occurred after 1650. 
Stéphane Haffemayer points out that Spain sent out no news on its own 
account before 1659. This implies that, before that date, information about 
Spain that reached European newspapers arrived through other intermediar-
ies, mostly Italian, French and Flemish, and with some delay when compared 
with communication from other peripheral lands.42
Given the dates, the reason for the marginal situation, indeed even the par-
tial failure of the postal and communicative flow, could be blamed on the posi-
tion of Spain at the beginning of the Thirty Years War—which is considered by 
some scholars as a true starting point for journalistic activities in Europe. 
Postal traffic was seriously hindered by a French boycott, which followed the 
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Figure 2.7 Main postal routes within the Iberian peninsula
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outbreak of the war officially declared some years after. The carriers had to 
look for alternative routes avoiding French soil (although the disruption to 
overland postal traffic through France was never total, with news and other 
letters and merchandise to and from Spain occasionally crossing France, even 
during wartime). Between 1689 and 1815, for instance, carrier boats sailed from 
La Coruña (in the North coast of the peninsula) to Falmouth in England. For all 
the perils of the Northern seas, this route made it possible to circumvent 
French territory.43
As the news traffic depended on the mail system, it was seriously harmed by 
the inconveniences of Franco-Spanish war (1635–59). But news found other 
ways to get itself broadcast. As early modern often dealt with military and dip-
lomatic matters, they often travelled with troops and ambassadors throughout 
Europe. News pamphlets and gazettes included sometimes blunt references to 
this fact, with the line ‘desde el campo’ indicating that they came straight from 
a military dispatch written on the battlefield.
The zeal of Spanish Habsburgs was remarkable too, and they strongly devoted 
themselves to maintaining law and order on the ‘caminos’, the roads on which 
their armies travelled. The defense of the ‘Spanish roads’ that, starting from 
Mediterranean coast, via Genoa and the Lower Palatinate, communicated 
between the two large strategic dominions of Habsburg Spain—the Iberian 
Peninsula and Flanders—is at the origin of most of their military or diplomatic 
decisions. But this route also consequently lay between the military targets of 
the Spain’s many enemies in this war, and its closure must have been an obsta-
cle for news circulation, too.
In fact, scholars have pointed out that communication between Spain and 
Flanders was made, curiously enough, indirectly through Italy. A major reason 
for this must have been continuous French harassment of Spanish roads and 
mails, which discouraged shorter and straighter routes.
Having said all the above, the Spanish news market must have been strongly 
dependent on the Italian market right through the first decades of the seven-
teenth century, for reasons all related to the communication infrastructure. 
This gave a communicative advantage and a prominence to cities near Spanish 
Mediterranean seaports, such as Barcelona and Valencia, places in which jour-
nalism was more often practiced than in inland Spain.
We need, therefore, further research which tries to analyze whether the 
Iberian Peninsula, particularly Spain, lay outside the main news networks, and 
whether this affected the development of early Spanish journalism. Our 
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hypothesis is that, before the Spanish-French war declaration in 1635, Spain 
was well connected to the rest of Europe through the same routes that served 
the rest of the European news markets. That is why the emergence of journalism 
in Spain is concurrent with its appearance in the rest of Europe and adopts 
very similar formats and genres.
A second hypothesis is that, from the outbreak of the Spanish-French war, 
Spain was progressively isolated, and that this contributed to the slow develop-
ment of news communication by comparison with other countries in Western 
Europe (and that this reason is at least as significant as the one that is more 
usually given, which always looks to censorship as an explanation for the delay 
of Spanish journalism).
It is noticeable that the most prolific moments of early journalism in Spain 
coincide with the period leading up to the outbreak of the Franco-Spanish war, 
around 1618, and the moments after the end of the same war: the official Gazeta 
Nueva—published under tacit privilege, and which no doubt might have 
helped in the ending of the Spanish communicative isolation—appeared in 
1661, only three years after the end of the war. Further research may prove the 
hypothesis or explanations given here, linking the evolution of Spanish jour-
nalism to the development of the international mail system.
 Portugal
In Portugal, as in the rest of Europe, the evolution of the postal service was 
complex, with different elements existing alongside one another well into the 
seventeenth and even the eighteenth centuries. First, by the coexistence of 
and, to a certain extent, competition between different systems for distribut-
ing messages. This complexity was also present within the royal administra-
tion, which granted different privileges to transport messages to specific 
bodies. Royal monopoly of the ‘private’ Post was not taken for granted but 
something that was historically built by different actors, not always following 
a ‘public’ interest. As a consequence, it is possible that most representations 
of postal systems in maps tend to focus, perhaps to a misleading extent, on 
the royal routes of the post, failing to give us a global picture of an intrinsi-
cally heterogeneous system in which the role of almocreves (mule drivers) 
and correios de pé (foot messengers) remained very important throughout 
this whole period.44
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 Origins of the Postal System of the Portuguese Monarchy
1520 saw the creation of the royal office of the Correio­mor. Administrated and 
inherited by private families, the office was incorporated in the crown only in 
1797. In the years after 1580, following the integration of Portugal in the 
Habsburg monarchy, the two main routes of communication of the early 
 modern period were organised the first connected Lisbon with the main relays 
of the north–south axis: Coimbra, Aveiro, Porto and Braga. The other main 
route was the connexion from the capital to Aldeia Galega, to the south of the 
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Figure 2.8 International news routes into Portugal in 1763, based on João Baptista de Castro’s 
Mappa de Portugal, 1762–3
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45 Thus there were more land routes to Spain than shown on the map: for example, the 
Coimbra Inquisition’s communication with Castille depended on the destination— 
letters via Almeida or Bragança to Valladolid; via Almeida to Murcia; via Valença to Galiza; 
via Évora to Granada. And there could be messages sent by ship to Coimbra, Porto, etc.
Tagus’s bank, with Elvas-Badajoz in the Castillian border, the relay to the postal 
system of northern Europe, Flanders and Italy.
The office of Correio­mor was sold in 1606 to the Gomes da Mata family 
(from Elvas, confirming the geographical importance of this nodal point). This 
family would monopolise and govern the post until the end of the eighteenth 
century. When the Gomes da Mata took the office, the royal postal network—
the ordinário—worked on a weekly basis between Lisbon and Braga. The juris-
diction of the Correio­mor extended to the maritime post in 1657 (the Indian 
Ocean excepted), but its role limited itself to fiscal operations of invoice and 
reception, not the conduction of letters.
As mentioned, alongside the crown other organisations had their own post 
or messenger services. Of particular note are the hierarchical network of the 
Church (bishoprics), the University of Coimbra, the Inquisition, and the royal 
charities (Misericórdias). In many cases the couriers employed by these ser-
vices travelled on foot. Every institution had its preferred routes and chose the 
best way to carry messages and orders.45
Even though the Crown paid the Correio­mor annually, it also made system-
atic use of its own, much more rapid, ‘extraordinaries’: special messengers who 
travelled day and night, with all the additional costs involved. The Crown could 
also make use to the Church network, more dense, to obtain information about 
local life and infrastructures. This dual system, of an ordinary service as well as 
extraordinary, high-speed couriers for special situations and much more nar-
rowly employed in the royal service, was also found in Venice, in England, in 
Spain, and in France. Broadly speaking, then, there was a contrast between the 
relative efficiency of the international mails to and from Lisbon, and the rela-
tive slowness of the land routes, especially within Portugal itself.
In the eighteenth century a series of conventions and agreements were 
signed in order to develop the domestic routes and regularise the international 
ones. The appearance of a stable weekly Lisbon Gazette (1715) should be seen in 
relation to the reliability and increased periodicity of such international con-
nections. Some important dates are:
1702: ordinary post service to the Algarve, followed by measures to pre-
vent mule carriers (almocreves) to carry letters.
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1705: convention with the English post (via the Falmouth Packet), with an 
agreement to establish a weekly connection between Falmouth and 
Lisbon.
1716–18: after the peace following the war of Spanish Succession, postal 
agreements with Castille in order to facilitate the postal exchanges in the 
border (Badajoz) and the weekly connection to Lisbon; land postal ser-
vice to Seville, via Tavira.
Eighteenth century sources also mention the development of alternative 
 maritime routes to the land postal service: mail arrived from France via 
Bayonne and from Spain via Cadiz. Nevertheless, complaints about the slow-
ness of the post and the inefficiency of the Correio­mor were an enduring topic 
(“Letters ran as slow from Miranda do Douro [northeastern Portugal] to Lisbon 
as from Paris to Lisbon”, observed one disgruntled observer in 1740, while the 
ambassador D. Luis da Cunha offered criticisms of his own, preferring the 
Dutch model). Proposals were made to incorporate the office into the Crown, 
in the hope of securing a more efficient administration.
 Britain
Britain (a term that is problematic in this period, as it refers to an archipelago 
notionally, but not actually in this period, united into a geo-political entity) is 
an interesting case with respect to the development of postal connections pre-
cisely because it is surrounded by water. It exists at the margins or periphery of 
the wider European network, but is still part of that network, not least because 
the rest of Europe was interested in news from Britain. Moreover, its connec-
tivity to the European postal system depended on a limited number of nodes; 
and inside those nodes it had a largely autonomous system. Thus it had its own 
logistical needs, as well as a distinctive relationship to the mainland.
What were the effects of the isolation of Britain by water, how did this 
shape the development of post and the cultures surrounding it, and how did it 
shape the role of news there? The north Atlantic archipelago is not unique in 
being a group of islands that constitute a geographically and politically semi-
distinct region of Europe. It may be unique in the imbalance between long-
term political and economic influence and its isolation. However, there are 
ways in which the culture of the archipelago was shaped by geographical cir-
cumstance and transport networks; and therefore it makes sense to identify 
some of its distinctiveness before proceeding with the mechanics of its postal 
networks.
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England—or even, after the union of 1536, England and Wales, a hendiadys 
that is often understood though left unspoken—is not and has never been an 
island. But you would be forgiven for thinking that some of its inhabitants over 
the centuries had mistaken it for one. Not only was there the problem of the 
northern neighbour Scotland (the union of the Crowns in 1603 did not prevent 
war, of course, nor the political union of 1707); but also the Isle of Man with its 
own parliament; and Ireland, which was an unsettled colony of the English 
crown with a strong Scottish presence. And there were the territories of north-
ern France governed by the English crown until 1558; which were followed by 
invasion attempts in 1627–29; and more successfully in 1658 against Dunkirk, 
which was sold back in 1662. So there were good reasons for not thinking of 
Britain let alone England as an island. But gradually through the seventeenth 
century it came to be thought of as one, and the English and British began to 
identify themselves as islanders.
However, the sea is important to the English imagination, as are boundaries. 
The model for understanding the geography of seventeenth England was not 
centre-periphery but through boundaries. Once a year, during Rogation week, 
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Figure 2.9 The water routes for news, showing landfalls at Edinburgh, London, Dover and Plymouth
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every child in each English and Welsh parish was required to follow the local 
priest or curate and ‘beat the bounds’ of his or her parish. Since 1559 this had 
been a secular function, undertaken not in imitatio Christi, but in order to 
know the boundaries of one’s parish. Walking around the periphery was how 
one knew where one belonged. Hence the sea represents where one lives. But 
it is also a convenient, fast and comfortable, if sometimes terrifying, mode of 
transport—and with the roads in appalling condition, as British and foreign 
travellers frequently complained, the sea was frequently preferable to land 
transport. The growing sense of Britain as an island was not necessarily rooted 
in xenophobic nationalism46 but in how English and Welsh people understood 
belonging to a place.
This permeable isolation—or peripheralness—also characterised the book 
trade in Britain, which in turn shaped the postal networks. The book trade was 
(i) uniquely centralised in London (itself not geographically central), except 
for a much smaller centre in Edinburgh, and some printing at the universities; 
(ii) regulated by a commercial body, the Stationers’ Company, whose jurisdic-
tion, however, extended only over England and Wales; (iii) more vernacular 
(and less Latinate) than the print culture of other European countries; (iv) 
shaped by the lack of indigenous paper production. These characteristics to 
some extent isolated the British book trade; but they also made it dependent 
on shipping. While being exceptionally insular, the book trade was also excep-
tionally dependent on trade, and thus on sea passage.47
 The Logistics of the Post in Britain
There were four main modes of transporting written or printed news in early 
modern England. First, the irregular services provided by packhorses and 
wagon kept for other purposes and used for communications when circum-
stances demanded. Both, especially wagons, were notably slow because of 
poor condition of the roads. As they were irregular their effectiveness and the 
frequency of use is hard to recover, and they were probably of limited impor-
tance in the development of news networks. Secondly, the private retainers or 
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servants employed by wealthy families and institutions to carry messages over 
shorter distances. This was evidently not cost-effective, and even in the letters 
of relatively wealthy families we find the expectation that correspondents will 
seek out other, common services.
The third mode was the carrier (or ‘common carrier’), a system for trans-
porting packets between specific points, with regular periodicity on certain 
routes. Carriers weekly left London to travel to many parts of the country. The 
poet, pamphleteer and occasional journalist John Taylor published in 1637 The 
Carriers Cosmographie, a manual facilitating the use of carriers in Britain, indi-
cating their destinations and times and places of departure. Its alphabetical 
organisation (by places of destination) serves to provide the reader with an 
early reference work; it then indicates the inn and day of departure. The full 
title is as suggestive as the text itself is practical:
The Carriers Cosmographie. or A Briefe Relation, of The Innes, Ordinaries, 
Hosteries, and other lodgings in, and neere London, where the Carriers, 
Waggons, Foote­posts and Higglers, doe usually come, from any parts, to 
townes, shires and countries [meaning counties], of the Kingdomes of 
England, Principality of Wales, as also from the Kingdomes of Scotland and 
Ireland. With nomination of what daies of the weeke they doe come to 
London, and on what daies they returne, whereby all sorts of people may 
finde direction how to receive, or send, goods or letters, unto such placed as 
their occasions may require. As also, Where the Ships, Hoighs, Barkes, 
Tiltboats, Barges and wherries, do usually attend to Carry Passengers, and 
Goods to the coast Townes of England, Scotland, Ireland, or the Netherlands; 
and where the Barges and Boats are ordinarily to bee had that goe up the 
River of Thames westward from London.48
Printing this information as an inexpensive, commercial pamphlet suggests a 
perceived expansion in communications, and a widening demand for postal 
services in the years prior to the civil war. And it was a changing, developing 
service: Taylor published a new, briefer guide around 1642.49 Even Taylor, not 
given to modesty, admitted that his information was patchy, so his guide can 
serve as a pessimistic picture of the minimum services available. Though not 
comprehensive it is nonetheless extensive. Taylor identified carriers conveying 
goods to most parts of England, and indicated how packages could be then 
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forwarded to Scotland and Wales. Ireland obviously represented different cir-
cumstances, and it is difficult to gauge in what quantities books were distrib-
uted there in the 1640s. The areas immediately surrounding London were 
predictably the best served, but Taylor also indicated local concentrations in 
Yorkshire, Gloucestershire and Dorset. His promotion of his book is suggestive, 
both of expansive geography and of the particularities of the English regions:
if a man at Constantinople or some other remote part or Region shall 
chance to send a letter to his parents, master, or friends that dwell at 
Nottingham, Derby, Shrewsbury, Exeter, or any other towne in England; 
then this booke will give instructions where the Carriers doe lodge that 
may convey the said letter, which could not easily be done without it: for 
there are not many that by hart of memory can tell suddenly where and 
when every carrier is to be found. I have (for the ease of the Reader & the 
speedier finding out of every townes name, to which any one would send, 
or from whence they would receive[)], set them downe by way of 
Alphabet […]50
Taylor also refers (in the guidance that concludes the pamphlet) to the post 
service available via Thomas Witherings (more on him below): ‘All those that 
will send letters to the most parts of the habitable world, or to any parts of our 
King of Great Britaines Dominions, let them repaire to the Generall Post-
Master Thomas Withering at his house in Sherburne Lane, neere Abchurch’.51 
The frequency with which place names appear in Taylor’s text may not be a 
straightforward indicator of the geographical density of the services to particu-
lar regions, but Taylor does show that there were means of distributing letters, 
and that these means were relatively easy to access. Speeds were slow, how-
ever: Carriers travelled at between 20 and 24 old English miles per day (statute 
miles, established in 1593, were the modern length of 1760 yards, or 1.61 km; old 
English miles were about 30% longer).
I will focus on the fourth mode of sending packets and letters: the post. This 
was arguably the most significant because swifter and cheaper. The royal post 
system in England and Scotland was essentially modelled on the Roman post 
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system, the cursus publicus. A ‘King’s Post’ first appeared in the 1480s, under 
Edward iv and Richard iii, though some semi-formalised system had been 
emerging for about a century. The service was significantly developed and 
improved under the Tudors, and Brian Tuke was formally granted the title 
‘Master of Posts’, recognising an office that had existed for years, in 1517.52
In the sixteenth century, there were four main postal roads in England, the 
longest terminating in Scotland; they were expanded to six through the early 
seventeenth century. These were not identical with the major mercantile 
routes. On these roads were staging posts every 10–12 miles. At each a post-
master was required to have horses ready for conveying royal messages; the 
remuneration for so doing—a penny a mile per job, doubled to two pence and 
then reduced to three half pence under Elizabeth, then increasing to two shil-
lings and five pence per mile in 1635—was not enough to cover the costs, at 
least not at the level of service required.53 In a way this was a form of regional 
taxation. The royal prerogative meant that the crown had the right to 
use the  goods of any subject in return for a payment that the crown deter-
mined. With the appointment of postmaster and the creation of a formal 
postal  system, the king no longer used his subjects’ horses, but required his 
subjects to provide a man with a horse. In return he paid a punitively low rate. 
However, a profit could be made from ‘by letters’—private persons could 
pay for the service, though their communications would have to be set aside 
for any official business. In other words, the royal post was a loss-making 
 business that relied on private enterprise to subsidise it; and it was a de facto 
monopoly.
The first two roads to be established with permanent staging posts—until 
then stages were ad hoc—were the great north road to Edinburgh, and the 
Dover road linking the kingdom with France. The year 1512 saw the semi-formal 
appointment of Sir Brian Tuke as the first postmaster, followed in 1514 by the 
establishment of a mercantile postal system. From 1555 to 1600, and especially 
in the last two decades of the sixteenth century, a series of parliamentary acts 
were passed aimed at improving the condition and maintenance of the roads. 
Permanent staging posts on the Bristol, Plymouth and Holyhead roads were 
established in the 1590s, in response to the military threat from Spain and 
the Irish rebellion; branches were established to the west midlands from the 
Holyhead road, where the weapons used by English forces in Ireland were 
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Figure 2.10 Post Roads in England, Scotland and Wales, c. 1675
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manufactured. Under Elizabeth the post was also tacitly opened to private cus-
tomers.54 This changed the enterprise from being a financial liability to a 
potentially lucrative one.
In 1603 the newly-crowned James I of England issued Orders for the Posts 
of our Realmes, and for all men to observe and obey in the speedy carriage of 
Packets, directed for our affaires, reviving and renewing previous orders. These 
stipulated the keeping of horses and means of carriage (cotton-lined leather 
bags); that each post must be despatched within a quarter of an hour of receipt; 
the keeping of precise records about packages sent (which, if they were kept 
and had survived, would be very revealing to the historian); and that the 
 minimum speed of conveyance should be seven miles per hour, reduced to 
five  miles per hour in winter (8 and 11.2 kph). These speeds were seldom 
achieved. The Orders were most precise about the limitation of the post for 
official use:
Every Post thus furnished shall at all houres receive and cary, or send 
away, all Packets or Letters brought unto him, directed for Our special 
affaires, dated on the outside, with the time and place of their first 
delivery, and subscribed by the hands of our Principall Secretaries, 
and Master and Comptroller general of the Postes: And for matters of 
the Navy, or to the Maritime Forts upon the Sea coast, or principal 
Port Townes, by our Admirall of England: For matters of the Cinque 
Ports, by our Warden: For matters of Scotland, by our Treasurer and 
Secretary of Scotland: And for Ireland, by our Lieutenant of the L. 
Mountjoy, Or addressed to them in the proper business of their places, 
or to the body of our Counsell, from what persons or places whatso-
ever: Of whose names, and addresse only, the Posts shall take notice, 
according to the first Institution, and Originall use of their service, 
and of none other.55
The royal protestations indicate concern over the Elizabethan opening of sys-
tem up to ‘by letters’—either because it made the system inefficient, or, more 
likely, because it appeared violate crown privilege and secrecy, of which James 
was peculiarly protective. In 1619 the first postmaster with specific responsibil-
ity for foreign parts was appointed, Matthew de Quester (more on him below). 
In 1635 De Quester’s replacement as foreign postmaster, his former deputy 
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Thomas Witherings, was granted a monopoly to run a national postal service, 
and he implemented a radical series of reforms, systematising the inland post 
(as the international post had been systematised), and opening the royal mail 
to the public, fulfilling a process begun under Elizabeth. The mails, which 
increased in speed, left London weekly on Tuesdays.56
This was surely the most significant event in the development of the posts: 
the shift in the function of the mail from what was officially a royal function, 
with a tacit permission of public use, to a public function; combined with a 
greater emphasis on the profit motive as a means of sustaining it (as opposed 
to the obligation to the crown). Witherings also regularised the rest of the post, 
as the Dover road was improved.57
Thereafter we can observe a pattern of increasing frequency of postal 
 despatches. This is notwithstanding the civil war, which disrupted but did 
not halt the operation of the service: king and parliament fought for con-
trol of the posts, and parliament won control of all but the Western road 
by 1643.58 In response the king sought in 1644 to establish an alternative 
post, based in Oxford and Weymouth. In 1649 the Commonwealth intro-
duced a Saturday post, and the Common Council of London its own post to 
Scotland. Prices were cut substantially in 1650, and in 1654 a third weekly 
post was introduced. The same Ordinance ruled that mps’ letters should be 
free, and, crucially, gave control of the post to the Protectorate’s Secretary 
of State, John Thurloe. The indefatigable Thurloe was also head of the intel-
ligence services. This confirmed the double-face of intelligence. The ‘Act for 
Setling of the Postage of England, Scotland and Ireland’ passed in 1657 
explicitly recognised this conjunction when it observed that a post office 
had proved:
the best means, not onely to maintain a certain and constant Intercourse 
of Trade and Commerce betwixt all the said Places, to the great benefit of 
the People of these Nations, but also to convey the Publique Dispatches, 
and to discover and prevent many dangerous, and wicked Designs, which 
have been, and are daily contrived against the Peace and Welfare of this 
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Commonwealth, the Intelligence whereof cannot well be Communicated, 
but by Letter of Escript.
Government surveillance, public news and private communication seem 
interlinked in this Act. The same Act established the first ‘general Post Office’. 
The 1657 Act also fixed a tariff for private posts. When the monarchy was 
restored in 1660 a General Post Office was established, followed by the Turnpike 
Act of 1663 which accelerated the improvement of roads.59
It has been demonstrated that the speed of the post improved during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: very approximately, journey times fell by 
half or more between 1450 and 1620.60 The invaluable analysis of Mark Brayshay, 
Philip Harrison and Brian Chalkley, based, on postmasters’ endorsements of 
letters, shows average journey times from London: 80+ hours to Edinburgh, 55 
to York, 50 to Plymouth, 40 to Exeter and Chester, 20 to Bristol and around 14.5 
hours to Dover (all in the 50 years to 1620). In addition to the increase in speed 
there was an increase in volume: for example, use of the Kent posts increased 
from an annual average of 229 packets a year in the period 1566–71, increasing 
by 70–80% in volume every five years or so to 2146 packets annually in 1589.61 
Of course the main routes could only carry a message so far. They were supple-
mented by sub-branches. Travel here was slower, not least because roads were 
poor. However, it has been estimated that most British towns were within 20 or 
30 miles of a staging post.62 Some large towns maintained municipal posts that 
provided a means for local distribution. The earliest extant record of such a 
service indicates that Norwich had one in 1569.63
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The late sixteenth century also witnessed substantial increases in expenditure 
on maintaining and improving roads: spending on the Great North road 
increased from £8333 to £10743 in 1566–76 and 1597–1607 respectively; pay-
ments to postmasters on the Dover road increased by nearly £800 a decade in 
consecutive decades up to 1597, reaching £1918 between 1586 and 1597. The 
most dramatic increases occurred on the Plymouth and Holyhead roads in the 
first decade of the seventeenth century. These leapt from around 5% of total 
Figure 2.11 Average travel times of post along Treasury­funded roads from London, 
1570–1620. Times measured in hours, based on postmasters’ endorsements. 
Adapted from Mark Brayshay, Philip Harrison, and Brian Chalkney, ‘Knowledge, 
Nationhood and Governance’, 279
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postal expenditure (1586–97) to over 40% (1598–1607).64 The care taken over 
the roads declined under James vi and i, and he was negligent in paying his 
postmasters (as indeed he was many of the state’s servants).
The costs of posting to the purchaser were as follows: a single letter was car-
ried up to eighty miles (128.7 km) for two pence, up to 140 miles (225.3 km) for 
four pence, and anything further than 140 miles cost sixpence. Postage to 
Scotland was eight pence. Prices were reduced in 1650; up to 80 miles from 
London for two pence, three pence to remote parts of England and Wales, four 
pence to Scotland, and sixpence to Ireland.65
The fee of the post service probably did not guarantee door-to-door delivery. 
It ensured delivery within a certain distance. Extra was paid for the final stage 
Figure 2.12 Post routes to south west England, showing main and subsidiary routes,  
with travel times to off­route locations. The dotted lines show the actual  
times (based on postmasters’ endorsements) taken to travel to off­route  
locations by royal post boys, calculated at 5.5 miles per hour (8.85 km 
per hour). Adapted from Brayshay, Harrison and Chalkley, ‘Knowledge, 
Nationhood and Governance’, 283 
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if it was brought to the recipient’s door. A suggestive illustration of this can be 
found in a bill of disbursements from 1641, which gives the price of ‘two printed 
declaracons’ as twopence, and a ‘diurnall of parliament Occurrences’, evidently 
a manuscript, as one shilling and sixpence. The purchaser also gave sixpence to 
the ‘post boy’ (that is, one who worked under a deputy postmaster, a word first 
recorded in 1588).66
 Foreign Post
A system of international posts had been run by English merchants since the 
early sixteenth century; prior to that British merchants had benefitted from 
mercantile communication systems based elsewhere, notably those operated 
by the Flemish. This system was declared a royal monopoly in 1591, taking the 
advantage from the Flemish merchants and handing it (temporarily) the 
Merchant Adventurers’ Company (who thereby gained effective control of the 
Dover road).
James vi and i granted the Flemish Matthew De Quester a patent to run a 
‘Foreign’ post in 1619, effectively providing competition for the inland posts 
and especially the Dover road. After running this successfully (and despite a 
challenge to his monopoly mounted in 1627 by the Merchant Adventurers’ 
Company), and making a profit through the private dimension of his business, 
De Quester was appointed ‘Postmaster of England for Foreign Parts’ in 1628. De 
Quester and his son employed 13 messengers: three for ordinary posts to 
France, six to Antwerp and Middleburg, three for the packet services to France/
Spain and Holland. On Thursday, on ‘the tyde that falleth after midnight’, let-
ters were sent to Brussels, Heidelberg, Cologne, Frankfurt, Prague, and the 
Paris-Turin-Madrid route. Letters for the Hague and Holland left on Saturday 
night or very early on Sunday mornings.67
After Witherings’ appointment in 1635, a note was posted on the door of the 
office for foreign posts which read: ‘for way of Antwerp everie friday, for way of 
France everie wednesday & for that of Holland everie Saterday al to be in the 
office before five in the afternoone’.68 The mail was to be in by 5pm, was sent 
off to Dover at 6pm, from where it took about 14 hours;69 packet boats sailed 
immediately for Calais. Until that point the post took an alleged 8 days to get to 
Antwerp; this new system was intended to reduce it to 3 days (although, again, 
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this ideal seems to have been rarely achieved in practice). In 1637 the Thurn 
und Taxis postmasters stated that under Witherings delivery between London 
and Antwerp took four days; between London and Milan, seventeen to eigh-
teen days; and between London and Naples, 23 to 24 days.70
Before the establishment of the international posts, and continuing along-
side them, were ad hoc couriers, paid irregular but often large sums and also 
travelling irregularly. Like diplomatic services, they constitute part of a news 
network, though it is difficult to generalise about the nature of their contribu-
tion to the shape and form of the network. There were also irregular means of 
communicating documents in national and international networks. Hence 
ships returning from Spain and the Levant made landfall at Plymouth,71 depos-
iting packets, but also collecting them en route to London. Although Dover-
Calais was officially (from the English point of view) the sole point of postal 
connectivity with the Continent it was plainly not. Similarly one Samuel Jude 
was running a private carrying service for merchants between Plymouth and 
London in 1626.72
 Significance of Posts to News Networks
The post quickly became an integral part of the news infrastructure, the foun-
dation of its operation as a network. While oral exchange must remain the 
most everyday mode of news communication, the way it worked depended on 
other modes. The communication of written and printed documents was per-
ceived to be sometimes though not always faster; but where it was not faster, it 
was understood to be more reliable. Documents confirmed or repudiated 
rumour. Moreover, news was associated with communication transport; hence 
‘to tell news after the carrier’ was proverbial for a futile action, like shutting the 
stable doors after the horse had bolted. Carriers told news (and pedlars told 
gossip). Hence news and postal and carrier networks were fundamentally con-
nected in language and culture more broadly. Post-houses became centres of 
information in themselves, and in certain jurisdictions, such as Sweden, the 
postmasters were the designated compilers of official newspapers.
News networks were bound together by conflict—confessional conflict—as 
well as by trade and community consensus. This caused sensitivity to news at 
other nodes in the network that bound Europe.73 Yet in Britain at least there was 
little done to transform the news into something that was more evidently confes-
sionally sympathetic. Specifically there seems to have been little adaptation 
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done in the translation of news: it tended to be neutral. This neutrality—and it 
is striking that during the 1630s the English government insisted that transla-
tions of news had to be literal—made the practical infrastructure all the more 
important as an influence on what news was available.74
The post had other significance and connotations. First, state centralisation. 
The increase in traffic and speed, and the systematisation of the postal ser-
vices, has been associated with state formation or modernisation. Thus 
Brayshay, Harrison, and Chalkley follow the historian Geoffrey Elton in his 
account of Tudor state formation: the connection may be overstated. The 
causes of the development of the postal system were probably at least as much 
economic as political, and likely to have been driven more by demand, includ-
ing the demand for news evidenced in other aspects of public life, than by the 
intentions of successive councils of state.
Secondly, surveillance. Searching posts seems to have been commonplace. 
It is significant that the meaning of the word ‘intelligence’ in English commu-
nicates news (as digested and interpreted by an editor) and what we would call 
spying.75 The relationship between news and state intelligence took off in the 
1580s under Sir Francis Walsingham, based on practical exigency as much as 
the emulation of foreign practices. This coincided with the opening of the 
Royal posts to private customers and the two things were at some level con-
nected. The opening of post was an important element of state intelligence 
(and, incidentally, ensured that, far from being entirely unguarded in contrast 
to print, manuscript news was often circumspect). By the mid-seventeenth 
century the Taxis service had a Black Chamber for the surveillance of postal 
communications, and it was certainly not alone. Opening letters was extensive 
during the civil war (ciphers were commonly used in correspondence) and 
was fundamental to the operation of the government in the 1650s under John 
Thurloe, who had his own Black Chamber.76 The 1657 act clearly established 
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surveillance as a function (as it implicitly had been prior to 1657). Hence the 
concern that Quakers expressed about the safe delivery of their letters.77 This 
is subtly different from the fear of interception of letters as they passed 
between different European states: the state fostered postal networks at the 
same time as it increased surveillance. And this happened simultaneously 
with the expansion of public debate, and the increased influence of that 
debate on national politics. It is further evidence of the very intricate ways that 
private culture and public culture are interwoven in Britain. News expanded, 
and as it expanded it was nonetheless governed by notions of secrecy and 
secrets of state.78
 Conclusion
This paradoxical dynamic—between a news culture expanding and develop-
ing a rich relationship with its publics (national and transnational), and the 
tenacious and in some ways increasingly subtle hold of notions of secrecy—
was integral to news culture in Britain, though signs of similar dynamics can be 
found in many other European cultures. As further evidence of this we might 
point to the fact that while the public posts of the late sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries emerged from expanding networks originally developed for 
diplomatic communication and other purposes of statecraft, they did not sim-
ply absorb or replace them. European rulers continued to maintain extraordi-
nary private couriers for their diplomatic communications alongside the 
regularly scheduled postal services; public use of the service rather displaced 
rulers’ original, essentially private conception of it, which then had to be 
reconfigured outside of the repurposed network. State consciousness of the 
exploitability of the public posts for purposes of surveillance of people and 
goods as well as information may have contributed to this perceived need.
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The other indispensable point to notice about the emergence of European 
postal networks is that, although locally variable in their administration and in 
the speed with which they were established, they were fundamentally transna-
tional in their conception. In Britain, in France, and in the Habsburg lands, the 
earliest established post routes were to speed communication with other 
states. The national scope of a postal network was always intended to reach 
beyond political and linguistic boundaries; and the transnational element 
always depended on a rich, internal involution. This was one of its strengths in 
promoting a European news culture that similarly was both local and pan-
European in nature.
Figure 2.13 Sketch map of major European postal routes operating at various times during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Collaboratively compiled, at the Vienna 
workshop of the News Networks in Early Modern Europe research project, 13/9/12, 
by Paul Arblaster, Nikolaus Schobesberger, Mario Infelise, André Belo, Carmen 
Espejo, Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham, with input from Oswald Bauer
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A full picture of the actual flows of news is not yet possible,79 but an impres-
sion of the spine around which that news flowed can be obtained from a col-
laboratively drawn map of Europe’s postal networks (see Figure 2.13). This can 
only be impressionistic, because it is neither exhaustive (it represents major 
routes, and only scheduled travel), and because the actual routes developed 
and changed over time, but it nonetheless presents an imaginative rendering 
of a European network of news.
79
79 See Ch. 4, below.
